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The ris® of consumer prioes during the past ysar or two has again
stirred up a lively interest on the subject of inflation. Soii» observers
argue that vs are, or recently have been, experiencing the familiar price-
wage spiral as a result of too much money chasing too few goods. Others
claim that we are, or recently have been, experiencing a new kind of infla¬
tion. Son» see the newness in administrative pricing by business, others see
it in the upward push of wages on cost, while still others see it in the con¬
tinued advance of prices despite a ’’tight-money" policy and federal surplus.
Some blame the trade unions for pushing tip wages and expanding fringe benefits,
others blame business firms for makizig up prices, still others blame bankers
for charging higher interest rates. And many criticise the Federal Government
for having allowed all these things to happen, or for spending too mtKsh money,
or for taxing too heavily or for taxing too li^tly.
The questions that have been raised by the recent public debate on
inflation are as difficult as they are important. If econtanists could
speak with a clear and authoritative voice of the subject, there would bo
nothing to do except to dust away confusion. Economic knowledge has not yet
1
reached that state, ai*d perhaps it never will.
At the close of World War II many economists preducted a siajor depression
as soon as the country*a pent-up demands for goods was satisfied. Congress
was sufficiently concerned to pass the Employment Act of 1946 in an effort




to prevent a return to conditions of mass unemployment. The National
Resources Planning Board prepared a series of reports on post war employ¬
ment and public works policies. The specter of the SO’s still hung over the
country, and the young war veterans were frankly anxious about their Job
opportunities as they faced retuni to civilian life.
But the expected collapse did not occur. The wartime prosperity which
started in 1940 continued into the 60*8 supported by record hlg^ peace time
arms expenditures. Most Americans found little difficulty in getting and
retaining Jobs at xmprecedentedly high wages. In fact, at many periods
there was a shortage of labor. Biisiness soared to undreamed of heights.
In spite of the general prosperity, many Individuals and groups
suffered a few Jolting blows. Farmers were well off during the Korean War,
but had a setback after the cease-fire.. There was industrial recession in
1957-8 during which unemployment surpassed or came close to the five million
mark. And countless American, particularly white collar workers, were badly
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squeesed by the spiraling cost of living.
Nature and Causes of Price Trend 1947-57
The recent trend of wholesale and oonsmer prices reflects numeroiis
and complex developments in the markets for many hundreds of commodities
and services. But one fact towers above all others, and to a large degree
sums them up — namely, the great and sustained expansion of aggregate demand
which has kept the economy operating in a state of practically full employ-
3
raent during almost the entire period since the end of World War II.
Maxwell S. Steward, "How Can We Stay Prosperous," Public Affaire
Pamphlet, No. 270, Augtist, 1958, pp. 1-2.
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The initial impulse to explansion was imported by the willingness and
ability of both consumers and business firms to spend money freely on the
many commodities which had been in short supply or entirely unaTailable
during the war. Other forces soon gathered strength, reinforced one another,
and gradually deepened the confidence of people in their own economic
opportunities and in the economic future of the ooxaitry. The most important
of these factors were the unexpected upsurge of population, the expansion of
the middle class, the on-rush of technology, and intensified pace of business
cOTiipotition, the resurgence of Western Europe, and general recognition of
government’s responsibility to help maintain prosperity. Although federal
e^qpenditures played a significant part at times in stimulating markets, the
main drive toward economic expansion came from the private econ<Hny. It is
well to recall how promptly the decline in federal spending after the end of
the war was offset by expansion in other parts of the economy. Between the
second quarter of 1945 and the second quarter of 1947 the annual rate of
federal expenditure on goods and services declined by 74 billion dollars.
In the meantime, "the rate of expenditure by the rest of the economic com¬
munity rose to 80 billion. Uuoh the same thing happened after the Korean
truce. Despite a decline of IS billion dollars in the annual irate of
federal spending, the rate of total national expenditure increased 20
billion dollars between the second quarter of 1953 and the second quarter
4
of 1955.
The great expansion of demand during the post-war years made its
influence felt in nearly every maikret, but especially in the capital goods
industries. Between 1946 and 1956 our total expenditure on goods and
^Ibid., pp. 2-3.
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senricas or the dollar value of the nation’s output, nearly doubled. During
the same period the outlay on fixed capital — that is, on business plants,
machinery, new homes, automobiles, roads, school buildings, military hard¬
ware, and other durables — increased 168 per cent. Expenditures of this
type were 23 per cent of the nation’s total output in 1946. A year later they
rose to 28 per cent or a full point above the level of 1929, when the boon
of the 1920’s was culminated. The advance did not stop there. By 1952,
spending on fixed capital reached 32 per cent of total output) and this ratio
5
has been maintained with only slight variations, since then.
The heavy concentration of the nation’s spending on fixed capital was
made possible in large part by credit expansion. Since durable goods and new
structure are costly as well as long-lived itesis, they are often purchased
on credit. Thus, while the federal debt changed very little, the outsteusding
private debt rose from 154 billion dollars at the end of 1956 to the enormous
total of 416 billion dollars ten years later. In the meantime, the debt of the
states and localities also rose sharply — from 14 to 43 billion dollars. The
close connection between this proliferation of debt end the intense demand
for capital goods is evident from the fact that mortgage debt, long-t;em
corporation debt, consumer instalment debt, and state and local debt, taken
together, account for nearly three-fourts of the debt expansion that occurred
6
during the decade.
The huge expansion of demand for capital goods, along with the increase
of demand for other commodities end services, was financed in part by the




existing stock of money. This is evident from the fact that the dollar
value of the nation*s total output increased 116 per cent between the end of
1945 and the end of 1966, while the money supply — that is, demand deposits
7
plus currency in public circulation — increased only 36 per cent.
The vast expansion of the nation*s aggregate demand, which was facilitated
by an imprecedented expansion of credit, tested the nation’s physical capacity
to prodijce during much of the post war period. We see evidence of this in
the low level of xmemployment that has characterized most of the post-war
years, despite the increasing rate of participation of people in the labor
force. We see it also in the persistence of substantial amounts of overtime
nork. The pressure of demand on phywioal resources became especially strong
in the durable goods and construction industries. Of this, too, there is
abundant evidence. We see it in the more rapid growth of physical production
in the durable goods and construction industries than in the production of
non-durables and services. We see it in the high level of unfilled orders on
books of manufacturers of durable goods. We see it also in the persistence
of a longer woric week in durable manufactxires than in those producing
8
transient goods.
When demand presses hard on a nation*s stock of physical resources, cost
of production and prices cannot remain stable. That at least is true as long
as markets are reasonably free and competitive. Under such conditions employers
bid actively for labor, whether it is organized or not, and wages tend to rise.
Prices behave in similar fashion, sometiaws rising before and sometimes after
^Ibid., pp. 4-6.
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wages increases. Every rise of wages and oilier incomes tend for a time to
stimulate consumer demand. Business investment likewise tends to expand,
partly because markets are growing and partly because a new plant or a new
piece of equipment is often the only effective means of reducing the pressure
of rising labor costs. If income or both price end income are expected to
move still higher, the impulses of expanding demand are again strengthened
all around. There can be little doubt that such expectations have ruled over
a great part of the post-war period, or that the ability of trade unions to
win wage increases which substantially exceed the increases that have been
ooouring in general industrial productivity did much to kindle and fan the
expectation of rising prices and incomes. Thus, expanding demand served to
pull up both prices and wages, while rising wages served to push both
demand and prices. With minor interruptions, this cumulative and interacting
process of rising wages, rising prices, and rising eeoncs&io activity has gone
on since the exKi of the war imder the sheltering umbrella of the monetary and
9
fiscal policies of government.
The bx*oad results are entirely familiar. Between 1946 and 1956 the
wholesale price level rose 45 per cent and the consuner price level rose
39 per cent. If we omot 1946, when reported prices did not as yet inflect
adequately the restoration of free maiicets, the increases are much smaller
but still substantial: 19 par cent for wholesale and 22 per cent for consumer
prices. Wages rose even more rapidly. Labor compensation per hour in the
private non-agricultural sector of the economy moved up 61 per cent between
10




The heavy oonoentration of demand on capital goods had repercussions that
were felt throughout Ihe economy. This demand could hardly have attained the
immense proportions of the post-war years without sui enormous expansion of
credit. Nor did the effect of bvying on credit stop with the capital goods
industries. The incomes disbursed by these industries were in largest part
spent rather promptly by the oonsuming public on all sorts of goods, the
production of which in turn generated new incomes and again stimvtlated new
spending. But if credit expansion was a key factor in price inflation since
the war, so also was the influence of trade unions. Their power in the capital
goods industries is great. They used it to win substantial Increases in
wages and related benefits for their members and thereby set the pace for
wage negotiations in other industries. In view of the favorable state of
demand, producers in the capital goods industries were usually in a position
to reduce or escape the pressure of rising labor cost by charging higher
prices. They did so with considerable frequency, and scmetimes even raising
prices beyond what their increased labor costs might jiutify. The capital
goods industries thus became the principal center from which advances in
11
costs and prices spread through the economy.
We are now in a position to examine store closely the price developments
of the past two or three years. The stability of consumer prices which ruled
between 1952 and the spring of 1956 proved ephmneral. After the mild
recession which followed the close of hostilities in Korea, another great
buying wave got tmderway in the late summer of 1954. Production rose
sharply, first in a few industries, later on a wide front. Wilhin a year,
^^Ibld., pp. 8-9.
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tho moderate amoimt of unemployment that had accxanulated in preceding
months was wiped out. The price lerel i^ained stable for a time, not¬
withstanding the wide rapid adwanee of eoon<»nio aotiTity, But aggregate
expenditure for capital goods kept inoreasing even after activity in the
home-building and automobile industries receded. Credit expanded at a very-
fast rate, just as it did at the time of -the Korean tipsurge. During 1955 and
1956, Individuals and corporations added 73 million dollars -to their debt —
an increase of 21 per cent in -two years. Sta-tes and localities increased their
indeb-tedness by 9 billion dollars — a rise of 28 per cent, llthou^ the money
supply proper grew by only 5 billion dollars, the combined 8V5>ply of money and
its close substitutes grew by 30 billion dollars. Meanwhile, with the eeonraiy
working at practically full capacity, the rate of increase in physical output
declined materially and the rate of increase in Industrial production declined
even more. Wages, on the o-ther hand, advanced energetically. In these
circumstances neither could not did prices remain stable. By mid-1955 the
level of wholesale prices began to move up again. Wine months later oonsmer
prices, of food as well as most other items, visibly joined the rising pro¬




Price is the quantity of one thing, usually, exchanged or demanded
13
in barter or sale for another.
Many factors are combined to make prices what they are. For prices are
^^Ibid., pp. 11-12.
13
Merrian and Webster, Webster*s Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield,
Mass., 1942), p. 786.
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the major criterion by which the producer can feel the pulae of the public.
He can know whether to produce cabbage or collars» wheat or rye, lamb or
beef, and/or caz^ or trucks. The system is not perfect, but no other known
system can guide the millions of producers to meet the needs of people so
well as prices do.
Finally, a small, continuing price rise may aot as a business stimulant.
Profits, especially in money terms, are boosted, encouaraging economic
expansion not only by providing stimulus end buoyant optimism but also
funds to pay for equipment. Whatever the merits of this argument, they
disappear if we cannot assume that inflation will be limited to fairly
steady, and certainly small, amounts. The expected benefits would likely
disappear if businessmen and investors realised what was happening, as
they doubtless would soon.
Prices change. They change as hours, days, weeks, months, and years.
Every change siffeets the relationship of individuals, of groxips of people,
and of nations.
Price changes are even more important in their effect on the total
production and national welfare. When prices are rising, industry is
stimulated. Those who borrow to produce, or buy for sale on a larger maricet,
prosper. The government that is in debt finds payment easy because taxes
so easy of payment that governments sre likely to take on new needed
services and contract further debts. Buying in advance of needs is
14
stimulated. A spirit of optimism and good-will prevails.
P. Warren and E. A. Pearson, Prices (Hew York, 1955), pp. 1-3.
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W9 use the tern inflation to mean a presistent rise of prioes "in
general." ^e tens is sometimes used with other meanings. For exampley
inflation is sometimes used to mean an Incirease in the money sttpply.
Inflation is a general, over-all increase in prioes, that is, in the
price level. Not every price may rise, and certainly not all by the same
proportion; but the average does. The catase (a major necessary condition)
is an increase in spending that results from a growth in the stock of money
15
or the speed with which it is used.
Inflation, like a submarine, cannot always be spotted. It is a phenome¬
non of many degi^es, and the tern is applied to illnesses ranging from a
mild cold to a massive cancer. Some inflations are astronomical -- the German
inflation after World War I (prioes rose by about 400 billion times). Other's
are disruptive, revolutionary, overwhelming, yet not great enou^ to make the
currency worthless; in Italy and France after World War II, for example,moiMy
depreciated to one fiftieth or thereabouts of its pre-war value. Ihen there
16
are inflations like ours since 1940 in which prioes about doubled.
Inflation is evil. Like the tempting siren, it may lure us with glorious
visions, but the rocks below can shatter our ship. The most obvious evil
of inflation is its cruelty. People who have put their savings into forms
that give them claims on money — pensions, life insurance, savings accounts,
bonds — fliri that their money buys leas and less. The tragedy la especially
pitiful because, for large numbers of people, the money had been saved for
a period when they could not provide for themselves — illness or ratii'emeot.




only slightly less distressing are the eases of people whose incomes,
though perhaps rising, increase less rapidly than price rise. Ministers
college teachers, government employees, landlords, persons with fixed-income
assets lag behind. There is little liklihood of either justice or economio
efficiency in the income changes that result dtiring inflation.
Other evils, though perhaps less dramatic, are economically and so¬
cially corroding. Inflation, at least after it has presisted for a while, is
economically wasteful. As there are changes in the valtM of money, the
measuring rod which ties together financial relationships, the conduct of
business becomes harder; rational calculation gets more difficult. A new
source of risk is introd\x;sd; alternatives involving the future cannot be
weighed as well as if the measure, money, were to remain stable. Choice
of occupation becomes more difficult. S<8ne firms will not undertake
ventures which would be beneficial to the coomunity} others, benefiting
fixm rising inventory values or iiio chance to sell at prices which rise
more rapidly than costs, over estimate their profit, over state the chances
for -this profit to continue, anl over extend themselves or make errors. The
allocation process, efficiency in resources use, suffers. Moreover, an in¬
flationary eooncm^ will get out of adjustment with other countries; trade
restrictions aai barriers that obstruct international exchange will likely
follow. Easy money and the assurance of jobs induce some relaxation in
the determination to put forth the beat day’s work possible. Careless,
slovenly results are to be e3q)Octed when the threat of unemployment and
employer discipline is weakened. Even what may sewa a small decline in
17
average human effort — say 5 per cent — will cost the economy heavily,
^“^Ibid. , p, 725.
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Inflation probably cuts a eoDsnunity^s long-run capacity to produce.
It oats away, directly and indirectly, the community’s capital. The physi¬
cal capital built nhen prices were lower will generally be carried on the
owner’s records at a figure below its replacement cost. The depreciation
costs used in fixing selling prices will not bo high enough to permit the
owner to replace his capital equipment. Consumers, in effect, use capi¬
tal without paying for it adequately. Inflation endangers the capital stook
in another way ~ by discouraging sawing end encouraging families to con¬
sume their capital. Some sawing will be made, ewen though the sawer can¬
not expect to get back in capital and interest as much purchasing power
as he giwes up; some saving is mora or less compulsory — pension plans and
mortgage redtaotion, for example. Tet, if -the wali» of money is deteriorat¬
ing and seems likely to continue to do so, the holding of fixed claims to
money beoomes less attractiwe. Capital formation that is tied In with lend¬
ing will decline, and sawing will be confined more largely to forms of
direct purchase of assets by the sawer.
Finally, inflation (except when small and gradual) has had social ef¬
fects. It adds a source of discontent and internal dissension, Qroxxp can
be pitted against group on the basis of inequality in the sharing of infla¬
tion, Self-pity and animosity cut the value of hvman life. Social cohesion
is reduced. Rancor, bitterness, and loss of servile are likely. The growth
of crime has been noted where inflations are large; corruption and efforts
18
to benefit by ewading regulations thriwe.
Good effects are sometimes attributed to inflation. The extreme is the
18Ibid., p. 725
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andorsament of inflation as a way to expropriate the property of the middle
and upper wealth groups. Such bloodless rsTolution can destroy wital
segments of a society and shift power and income to a new group; when the
C(MmBimi8ts took orer Hungary after World War II, for example, inflation
seems to have been produced deliberately. Less extreme is the argtmient that
some inflation is good because it cuts the burden of debt (such as goTemment
debt): less sacrifioe is inwolved in paying a given number of dollars of
interest and principal; the owners of the debt, of course, suffer a loss
equal to the gain of others.
Another argument is that inflation may produce desirable shifts of
resources. Perhaps when an econcmiy is up against a servere strain, such as
war, changes in relative prices (within a given price level) and dii^ot
allocations of labor and materials cannot bring a big enouch transfer of
resources quickly to maximise military output. Some price and wage in¬
creases will speed the shift of labor and other productive capacity — and
rise the average level of prices. Reducing wage rates and incomes in in¬
dustries prodttcing "civilian" goods may be a slow process, but boosting
them in military industries may be easy and quick. Moreover, higher
prices will force a reduction of consusptlon, especially by those whose
inccHnes do not rise proportionately. Although taxes could also cut oon-
Bxmaption to free resources for military production, the potency of infla¬
tion must be recognized.
But we believe that the identification of inflation with generally
rising prices is common usage in the United States today. Certainly most of
the significant statements we make every day about inflation are statements
about a general rise in orices. It is the rise in price that redtxjes the
14
purchasing power of the dollar, that squeeses the liring standards of
pensioners, that makes depreciation allowances inadequate to cover replace-
19
ment cost, and so on.
Nor do we regard a modeMite fluctuation of prices, etch as price rise
that normally occur when business is expending, as evidence of long-tem
inflation, so long as the economy is stifficiently elastic to allow any
general upward fluctuation to be balanced by subsequent downward fluctuation
of prices. We are concerned about the possibility that prices will show a
strong tiqpward trend. This may occur if prices increase mox*e during expan¬




It is the purpose of this study to examine the different approaches to
the cause of price inflation in the interim l947-l95Tj to show the nature
of each inflationary gap; and to determine if the cause of price inflation
can be directly associated with labor, business management, or governmental
fiscal policy.
^^ibid., p. 726.




Host of the eoonoaic writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
held that the general level of e(»Biaonity prices is soaehoir diiectly related
to the supply of the precious metals which serre as money. But there
developed wide differences of view as to the prooess by idiich changes in the
money supply brought about corresponding changes in coimnodity prices. Since
these diverse conceptions are also found in present-day discussions, it is
essential that we examine the several monetary theories that have been
developed.
Those who aaphasise the value of gold as the determining factor in
price levels start with the fact that under the gold standard a certain
weight of bullion is legally defined as the standard, or measure, of values
in general. It seemed obvious that sny factor which affects the value of the
conmiodity adopted as a standard would automatically affect the prices of
commodities expressed therein. In the words of British economist Ricardot
"If the value of money were to fall, the price of every oommodily would rise,
for each of the ocmpetitors would be willing to spend more mon^ than before
1
on its purchase."
The theory that price movements are simply reflections of changes in
the value of the commodity, gold, was rooted in observations of primitive
barter exchange — in which commodities, including specie, are traded directly
one for another. In early gold mining communities, for example, gold dust




or nuggets were in fact comnonly traded directly for supplies, provisions,
and other goods and servioes. Where miners struck it rich and osme to town
on a Saturday evening with an abundance of the yellow metal, would be
willing to exchange it on a liberal basis for gpods and services desired.
The exchange involved a direct comparison by individuals possessing gold and
2
goods respectively ^ with each party weighing comparative utilities.
Meanwhile a second approach to the price problem had been developing.
In this line of reasoning a unit of gold is not compared with a unit of
wheat, cloth, or other commodi'ty. Rather, the total number of monetary
units, or counters, in ciroulation is cisapared with the total number of
units of coBuoodities being offered in exchange. Instead of thinking in terms
of money as a standard, or measure, of values, the thought of these writers
run in terms of another function of money — that is, as a medium of exchange.
In its simplest form the comparison would be only between the quantity
of specie in circulation and the volume of goods offered in the market
places. But as other, supplementary, forms of currency came into use it
was seen that the exchange process involved all forms of money, including
checks. Moreover, it was reasoned that since the money supply was normally
used many times over in the course of a year, the velocity of its circulation
also had to be taken into aooount. Eventually all this was formalized in
a so-called equation of exchange, which held that the number of monetary
units in circulation divided by the number of units of goods equal the
price level. In this approach it is assumed that the money supply and the
goods supply are in no way connected — that they are independent variables.
The money supply is held to be governed primarily by the output of gold
^Ibid., pp. 10-11
17
mines while the goods supply depends upon the physical factors gorerning
production •» land, labor, oe^ital and management. Implicit in this analysis
is the assumption -that money is in no way related to production — that it
enters the picture only in oonnection with the exchange process.
Hihile the price level might be affected by quantity changes on the
money side or goods side of the equation, it was held that changes in the
production of precious metals were the primary cause of chaises in the level
of prices. Thus the price revolution of the sixteenth century was explained
by the discoveries of gold and silver in the Hew Worldi the decrease in the
price level between the Hapoleonio Wars and the Middle of the nineteenth
century by the declining annual production of gold; the ensuing rise of the
1850*8 by the discovery of gold in California and Australia} the decline in
the seventies and eighties by the gradual depletion of gold mines} and the
rise beginning in the nineties by a combination of new gold discoveries, in
Alaska aad elsewhere, and the development of the cyanide process idiich made
possible the profitable extraction of lower grade ore.
It was early recognized that the forces affecting the prices of
commodities transcend the bounds of individual countries. Since gold was
produced in many parts of the world and was readily transpoirted from country
to country, the value of gpld, like that of wheat and cotton, was said to be
detemined by world>wide conditions of supply and demand. It was reasoned that
a fall in the value of g>ld in consequence of the discovery of rich new siines
or a more efficient exploitation of old ones would shortly be reflected in
rising prices throughout: the world.
The international monetary system reached its culmination in the period
just preceding World War I. Host of the world was on the gold standard;
exports and imports, together with the service items which help to make up
18
the total of international aoonomio operations, were Tirtually in balance;
exchange rates moved in a narrow range between the gold export and import
points and specie flowed in modest amounts in response to temporary needs.
Economioally speaking, the world could be said to have reaohsd a state of
3
balanced equilibrium.
More or less contemporaneously there was evolving whet has come to be
known as the income approach. The focal point of attention with this approach
is the flow of money-income to individuals. In a pecuniary society the great
bulk of individual income is received by participants in the productive
process in the fora of wages, interest, rents, and profits. Since this
stream of money income is more or less concurrently disbursed in payment
for goods and services desired, it promptly moves again through the
ohaimels of trade and production until it is once more disbursed in the
fora of mon^ income. This circular flow is of course continuous •» though,
to be sure, it may fluctuate in magnitude with changing b^miness conditions
with this approach is demand — since the effective siarket demeand for oosuBodi-
ties depends upon the aggregate money income in the possession of consumers.
The income approach differs from the value of gold and quantity of
money theories in one vitally important respect. The analysis is not
anchored in a gold base nor in the existing stock of money. Under the value of
gold and quantity of money theories, as we have seen, i±t9 price level is
supposed to be governed, directly and automatically by changes in the
over-all supply of gold, or money. Ho thought is given to the possibility
that some of the potential money supply might be idle or that the proportion
°lbid., pp. 11-14.
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used Bight fluotuate widely from time to time. The income approach holds
that only the actual stream of money income currently being received and
expended affects market prices. Fluctuations in such income are governed by
the factors responsible for changes in general business conditions, and in
the rates or remuneration to those who engage in production. Moreover,
longer term price changes may very widely from the supply of gold and other
forms of money.
While the income approach was Urst outlined as early as the middle of
the eighteenth century, it was not until recent times that it gained extensive
vogue. As we see, it now occupies a prominent position in current explanations
4
of general price movement.
The State of Contemporary Thinking
Perheps the most common explanation of the advance over this period as
a whole runs in terms simply of the increased supply of money in circulation.
An increase in the supply of mozisy lowers 'tiie value of the monetary unit.
5
This is another way of saying that it raises both prices and cost.
Numerous writers have defined government borrowing from banks as
"monetizing** the public debt. The government borrows from the banks by
selling its securities to them and the banks write up deposit credits for
the government to use. This process inflates the banking system, on both
the assets and the deposit side of their books. It blows up the system tar
beyoxid its normal.... Inflation of the banking system inflates the money
supply. The influence of the vast increase in the money supply premeates
^Ibid., pp. 14-15.
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the whole economic structure and affects all our economic life.... The
increase in bank deposits resulting from government borrowing at the banks
has been held responsible Ibr an artificially low level of interest rates,
which further stimulated advances in prices.
So long as the public debt continues to be monetised through the
purchase of government securities by the banking system, the supply of
money will continue to increase, thus tending further to reduce the interest
rates on savings and investment funds. The resultant pressure of an increas¬
ing money supply and of lower Interest rates is bound to have a further
inflationary effect upon all capital assets and to increase the difficulty
6
of holding down the cost of living.
Another group of economists emphasizes the increase in mass incosies,
and intense demand for consumer goods as the primary cause of the great
advance in prices. To be sure, both supply and demand are taken into
account but "excessive deomnd, nob deficient supply, is the core of the
difficulty."
"Inflation" ims its genesis in an increased volume of spending by con¬
sumers, business and government. Tbe increase in spending oan ordinarily
be matcbs d only in part by an expansion in the volume of commodities and
services offered for sale.... Vith more awney and no more civilian goods
to spend it on the income recievers of the country would, of course, be apt
to bid up prices.
The total purchasing power of consumers was greatly swelled, during
and after the war, by record employment at generally higher wage rates and
^Ibid., pp. 20-21
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rise in net farm income, backed by accumulations of liquid assets roughly
equal to a ^ar*s disposable income, and supplemented by credit resources
for acquiring durable consumer goods and homes. War and postwar policies
toward veterans, farmers, and wage earners have notably added to the volcme
7
of purchasing power in money terms.
k few writers place primary emphasis upon forces operating from the
cost side. There is a strange contradiction between the insistence of
Federal officials and the need for price stability and their failure to deal
in a realistic way with tto underlying inflationary forces which they and
their predecessors have done so much to create. Step by step through many
years, a structure of inflation has been built into our economy. Higher wages
and higher farm prices have been consistent aims of FederaJ. policy . It
would be difficult to find two points in the price structure where political
pressure could be applied with great effect on the general price level
and the cost of living. As pri ces in general have moved higher, federal
prss8uz*e in these two fields has been strorger and more direct. There is
a similar inflationary interaction between wages and farm prices, especially
since the wide-spread adoption of the escalator clause in union contracts.
Higher farm prices swan higher cost of living. Higher cost of livizg mean
higher money wages, which mean higher prices for the industrial products
bought by farmers. Higher {srices for the things the farmer buys mean higlMr
8
farm-price parities and higher support prices for fauna products, and so on.




stuffs, was determined mainly from the cost side and not from the demand
side. Prices were related to the respectire changes in wage and productivity
9




Some ixidustrial and financial leaders in the current depression are
also engaged in the act of deflecting attention from our serious unemploy¬
ment problem to the issue of inflation. The ink was hardly dry on the
proposals by the Committee for Economic Cevelopnent to stimulate our
economy through tax reduction, when this group issued a sophisticated ex¬
position of its views on inflation.
Inflation suddenly loomed up as a major issue, peculiarly, at a time
when overall price stability was most apparent. Moreover, the coaimittee,
seeking a scapegoat for its fears, found it in the trade unions. Latching
on to the new theory of inflation described as the 'Svage-prioe" explanation,
it declared that the "main problem is in the field of labor whej^ there is
no law or not even a public philosophy or policy for the limitation of
1
economic power.”
Other economists who wsoited to prove their impartiality and moderate
the seeming animus against business resulting from changes of abuse of
economic power in price administration glibly coupled the business
corporation and labor as the cause for price increase. Ejy a sleight of
speech, they have implied that labor means organised labor and, therefore,
the trade-union movement. The cause of price rises lies, they reasoned, with
abuse of power by both corporation and trade unions. Among soma businessmen
and economists, it has become popular to speak of the inflation experience
^"The Joint Economic Comiaittee Congress of the United States,* The




from 1955 to 1957 as having been produced by pressures from the cost and not
the dffiaand side. They found it easy to explain the inflationary cycles
created after the second World lar and the Korean incident, but the recent
experience was new and baffling. Superficially, they witnessed price rises.
Wage rates also tended to be increased by reason of the progressive upward
movement of the Consumar Price Index. It is easy to oharaoterise the results
as a "cost-push** inflation overlooking the role of the oligopolist. There
was not much difficulty for these then tq switch the characterisation to
"wage-oost” inflation. The whipping boy thus became the trade unions whioh
had forced sellers to increase their prices. This new phase took big busi-
2
ness off the hook.
The number of assimptions have been made in the presentation of the in¬
fluence of wage increases on our economy whioh need further elarifioation.
The charge direct or implied, that trade unions are responsible for the
price movement should be challenged. First, union contracts are not as
pervasive as is implied. Significant employers remained unorganised even in
the Btost highly unionised manufacturing industries. The policies followed
many companies are unilaterally determined.
Second, the blue-collar or production-worker segment of our economy
is being materially reduced so that wage increases negotiated by it have a
deereasing impaet upon final cost. Becent evidenoe on the ohanges in
employment in the manufacturing industries indicates that the ratio of
production workers to all employees has decline from 83.7 per cent in
1947 to 76.9 per cent in 1957. While the total number of production workers
^bid.. pp. 18-19.
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had increased over the 10-year period by 1 per cent, the non-production work¬
ers had expanded by 55 per cent* The greatest rise had taken place among
professional and sales personnel. What is most significant is that the
ratio of non-production workers has been particularly high in some of the
expanding and oligopolistic industries.
Third, the rate of wage increase among the non-production workers
appears to hare been even greater than among blue-collar workers.
Fourth, many unions have negotiated varying amounts of wage increases
much below the patterns set by the pace makers, because the bargaining and
eoonomio situations in their area were not favorable or their eeonomio power
was insufficient to yield more equitable results.
Finally, the disoussion of the influence of unions on wages frequently
prooeeds from the assumption that the union administers wage policies and
that they stem exclusively from the rooms of executive and negotiating
ooramittee and mass meetings of the union. Wages are negotiated between
two contending parties, each seeking to promote the interests of its own
constituency.
The responsibility for negotiations and wage polioy froa the point of
view of the enterprise, and even the full economy, rests with managmaent.
If there is public dissatisfaction with the wage packers it agrees to,
bases on criticism of management assumptions oonoeming its capacity and
the propriety of passing on higher costs end higher margins to the public
in the form of higher prices, the remedy rests in limiting this power to





Actually, labor has been a Tictia of inflation and not the cause of it.
Throughout the entire period of prices in the post war decade, labor*s
gains were leas than it had a right to expect.
Labor unions long ago ncule the principle of fair share in increased
fruits of the econosy a basic part of their philosophy. Experience has
shown that unless the fruits of rising productivity are shared equitably we
soon have over-production axid depression. lew machines and methods enable
us to turn out more goods and services, but if our ability to oonsum and buy
up goods and services is not increased correspondingly, idle men and idle
4
machines are inevitable.
What gains has labor actually made during the period if inflation
which has troubled the country since the end of World War II? A recent
Sreport issued by the Joint Eoontffiio Committee of United States Congz^ss
sheds light on this. It shows that between 1947 and 1956 the real
wages (that is, wages adjusted to reflect changes in the purchasing power
of a dollar) of adl workers in the United States went up 32*6 percent. In
other words, on the average, wage and salary workers were able to buy 32*8
percent more in 1957 than in 1947 with each hour of pay received. If one
includes the cost of fringe benefits along with wages increases, the gain in
average hourly compensation for wage and salary workers was 35.2 percent
5
during this period.
Using a formula which states the actual gain in output per man-hour
conservatively, the Joint Economic Comnittee found that the rise in pro¬
ductivity for the entire private economy during this period was 37 percent
*Labor, Big Business and Inflation (Industrial Union Uepartment, AFL-
CIO), l^ashington, September, l95d, pp. 6-6.
®Ibid., p. 6.
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vhloh shows that total rsal oos&pensation for SBqjloyses, incladisg wagss
sad Arings benefits, had not kept pace with rising output of the eoonos^
as a whole.
TABIS 1
I5CBEASE IH LkBOR PAIHEBTS CQMPAfiED 70




Average Hourly Wage and Salaries in
Constant Purchasing Power 100 152.8
Average Hourly Compensation in Constant
Purchasing Power (including pension,
hospitalisation a^ other fringes) .... 100 155.8
Seal Product Per Han>Hbur, All Persons
Total Private Economy 100 157.0
Source I H.S. Congress Joint ^oontmiio CooBittee, September, 1958
This should help dispose of the argument that unions, spearheading the
drive for wage and salary earners, have put labor in the driver*s seat md
made gains at the expense of other groups in the eoonoaqr* Bomver, a word
of caution Is in order regarding the comparisons between money wages and
produetivi'ty.
Productivity figures measure the actual change In the physical output
of goods and services. Money wages, on the other hand, do not refleot
changes in a worker's ability to purchase such goods and servioes. Only
when money wages are adjusted, as has been done above to allow for the fact
that rising prices have reduced the value of ^e dollar, do we have a real
measure of the worker's abili^ to purchase goods and servioes. It is real
28
•umings uid not sonsy earnings which sust be oooipared with real inoreases
in output per san-hour to detersixte whether workers have reoeived a fair
share of the inoreasing fruits of industry.
The data on wages and productivity during the past few years clearly
oan completely discredit the idea that unions and workers have profited at
6
tlM expense of other groups during the inflation.
The Rise in Hanufacturing Prioes
Unions have been relatively sore suooessfnl in organising the production
and maintenance woricer in big manufacturing industries* Therefore« an
exsmination of wages, coats and prices in the manufacturing part of our
economy alone oan provide an even better test of whether or not union wage
policies have been the cause of inflation. If a union-led inflationary
wage squeese were taking place, we should see it here clearly.
Mr. Murray WexTiick. Senior Economist of the Federal Reserve Board, has
recently completed a study which sheds interesting light on this question.
Taking the average for the years 1947-49 as a base, Wemiok studied the unit
wage costs in manufacturing between 1947 and 1957) that is the amount of
au>ney spent on wages for each unit of output.
If we oompare Werniok*s figures on unit wage costs with the wholesale
prices of all oosmodities other than farm products and food, whet we will
fiiad is tkxmn in Table II.
As we can see. unit wage costs went up 15.7 percent in this period, lhat
happened to the industrial price level during the seme year? It Jumped 25*6
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Source: U.S. Department of Conanerce, 1958.
The steel industry and its powerful corporate leader. U. S. Steel,
furnished a good example of the inflationary pricing policies followed by
big business in general. This basic industry is dominated by four cor¬
porations which account for well OTer half of all the steel capacity in the
United States (58.S percent during the first six months of 1957). As a
matter of fact, if we use a more meaningful measure of market power — the
degree of control over specific steel products such as steel rails or axels —
we find that the dcnainanoe exercised by a handful of firms is STon greater.
For example, during the first half of 1967. four companies controlled the
entire shiimient of eleven products (over one-fourth of the number of indiTidual
steel products) and more than 75 percent of ten other products.
A recent inquiry ^y the U.S. Senate shows what happened to steel prices
^Ibid.. pp. 12-15
30
in 1957* In July of that year, the United Steel Workers of ^lerloa reoeived
a wage increase carefully estimated by the union on the basis of data sub¬
mitted by the steel companies at about 16.4 cents per hour. (U.^. Steel in¬
flated the figure to 19.4 cents per hour in its testimony before the Senate
Conaaittee.)
At the time the wage adjustment was made, the steel workers union pointed
out that productivity in the steel industry was rising so rapidly the
companies could easily absorb the wage increase, keeping prices stable oad
still making record profits. The union estimated the rate of productivity
increase in the first four months of 1957 wais about five percent on an
annual basis.
Between 1947 and the spring of 1957, for example, vdiile unit labor
costs had increased only a total of S4.7 percent, the steel Industry had
raised prices 96.3 percent, or nearly three times more than the increase
6
in its labor costs.
Steel is not the only example of a major industry dominated by a hand-
fhl of powerful corporations which are free from, the checks end balances of
competition.
The automobile industry also establishes prices without any regard for
the public interest. Hera, three ocsnpanies control over 97 percent of the
industry's output, and one of them. General Motors, is currently taking
9
over 50 percent of the auto market.
On September 29, 1959, Foz*d announced its prices for its 1957 models,




increased no more than our actual cost for materials and serrioes has gone
up...". The clear implication was that the price increases covered the
10
cost increases.
Three weeks later General Motors announoed its 1957 Chevrolet prices.
On four comparable models, the Chevrolet Model was five dollars below Ford,
on one it was the same, and on nine models it was #23 to $53 higjher.
Within two days, Fcard came out with a new announcement. As might normally
be expected. Ford lowered its prices downward in those oases where comparable
Chevrolet Modles were below Fords and raised the {srioes on the remaining
models to meet the prices of Chevrolet. It took advantage of this opportunily
to increase its profit margins, rather than compete wiih lower prices and
increase its share of the market.
This is clearly a case where competition is no loiger as effective as
before whexe one company sets prices and other merely fbllow. This road,
too, leads to inflation.
Writing in 1924, Donaldson Brown, a vice-president of General Motors gave
us at least a partial picture of the General Motors' price-making process.
(Article published in Management and Administration, February-April, 1924).
He suggested that prices were set to gain a certain fre-determined long-term
rate of profit on an average or standard volume of production.
Since this is the case, it becomes important to know vdiat profit rates
General Motors sets as its normal goal end how it calculates its standard
voluBS or average level of operations. According to Mr. Brown, General
Motors assumes that, over the long haul, the maximum rate of profit it can
^^bid., pp. 24-25
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consistently enjoy Is twenty peroent of total invested cc^ital, after taxes.
(Another Geiwral Motors vice-president did not want to be pinned down in
1955, but in testifying before a Senate Committee, he spoke of a target rate
11
of return of "between 15 and 20 percent" — also after taxes.)
At idiat level of operations does General Motors expect to earn that
20 peroent, after tax return? At 100 peroent of oapacity? At 90 peroent
of oapaoi'tyT
A reoent article by Daniel Cordts in %all Street Journal notes:
What*s the industry's calculated standard wolume today? Estimates
range all ihe way from 33 peroent of capacity to 80 peroent. 'Ify
gtMSS', says one executive, 'is that the industry as a whole has a
total capacity of 10 million oars and an aggregate standard volume of
perhaps 55 peroent of that, or 5.5 million oars'".12
Big Busins ss and Price Administration
The prevalenoB of administered prices in vast areas of oiu* economy is
not open to serious question. What is debated is whether the prices are sezisi-
tive to market changes; whether the sellers abuse this power to over-price
the goods aad services they market: and tend to divert purchasing power
from other areas to themselves to such an extent as to constitute a drag on
the entire economy, to stimulate inflation and, subsequently, a recession.
A considerable body of expert opinion now associates the appearance of
"creeping inflation" with this control of our pzloe structure by large,
dominant corporations who aet as price leaders and set prices according to
predetermined cost-plus formulas, reinforce their own market position
^^Ibid., pp. 25-26.
^^WaU Street Journal, December 10, 195?.
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through ad'vertising and other foms of non price competition, end whose
hugh profits have graded unions on to seek hi^ wage inoreases. These
men see, in the modification of price policies and beharior of these large
companies, the possibility of substantially restraining creepirig price in¬
oreases end in stabilising our price lewel and economy.
There is much suppwt fbr the above position both on the basis of
experience aid theoretical grounds. Most of the price increases in recent
years have taken place in the fields dominated by large corporations which
tend to administer their own price system. Moreover, there has been a
market tendency in some areas for prices to move only in one direction, name¬
ly, upward. The recent price reduction in the aluminum industry which was
subsequently canceled, interestingly enough was attributable to the Russians
under-selling the Aluminum Corporation in British markets rather than Ay
competitive factors in this country.
Gardner Means, in his testimoney befox*e the Senate Antitrust Ad Monopoly
Subcommittee, reported on his analysis of wholesale price changes from
June, 1955 to June, 1957, For 60 commodities, "wholesale prices changed
less than 8 times in an 8-year period and for 92 oosaaodities,,,prices changed
more than 77 times in the same period," He fouxid that "msu’ket prices declined
on the average 1,4 pwrcent while the administered prices rose on the average
10,2 percent." He concluded that "in So far as these data represent a fair
exasiple of wholesale price behavior for market price s and for the least
changing adodnistrstive prices, they indicated that idle major movement in
the last 2 years has come in the most administered prices and not in market
13
The Relationship of Prices to Economic Stability and Growth, op. cit.,
12-14:pp.
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prioes as a group." After a study of food and agricultural prices whidi he
found had declined, and physical food consumption, which remained stationary.
he concluded that "the current inflation is not the result of a general rise
in demand but is a product either of a specialized increase in demand which
has not spread out. or lifted demand in general, or is a product of upward
IS
price roTisions within the area of pricing discretion."
Additional evidence of the over-riding influence of the administered
price sector upon our economy is supplied by the relative price behavior of
the durable end nondurable gpods industries over the period from 1947
throi^h 1957. The wholesale price of durable good manufactured (which were
identified as consisting of the prioes for consumer durables and producer
finished g>ods in the wholesale price series), in which area a substantial
proportion of the producers are subjected to administrative price control,
rose by 53 percent as compared to 10 percent for the non-durable goods in¬
dustries. During this sane period the comparative rise in unit labor costs
for the durable goods industries was 15 percent and the non-durable goods
industries. 11 percent. The wholesale prioes for durable goods increased
more than three times the rise in unit labor costs, whereas the increase
in wholesale prioes for the non-durable goods actually was less than the
14
rise in unit labor costs.
The power of those corporations administering prioes in the key industries
is best exemplified through the analysis of individual industries. The report
by the Kefauver Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly highlights this issue
in the steel industry as revealed by the study of the price increase of July,




1957. The izidustz^ has been highly concentrated, with the United States
Steel Corporation maintaining a dominant position and acting as price leader.
The "practice of price leadership...appears to operate Just as effeotiTely
when prices are increased as when they are reduced.” The report finds that
there have been relative few entrants into the industry in recent years and
several constructed their facilities with the aid of the Federal Government.
As elaborate price system has been in use in the steel industry which was
derived from m earlier baslng-point arrangement vfaich has "produced complete
15
identity of delivered prices at sny given point of destination". As for
prices, they have moved on a number of occasions in the opposite direction
to that which wmild have been indicated by the changes in demand. Thus the
steel price index continued its virtually unbroken rise even when demand and
production declined (as they did in 1947, 1954, md 1957). It also continued
its climb even when unit labor costs declined (as they did in 1950 and 1955).
The oommittee also concluded that the price increase substantially exceeded
the cost increase in 1957 and apparently also in 1956. It is also reason¬
ably clear that at the time the 1957 price increase was made there was
nothir^ in the infbrmati on available to suggest a forth-coming incre&se in
16
demand which would support higher prices.
Host significant, the committee found that the 1956 and probably the
1957 price increase widened the margin between unit costs and priees. The
"break-even" point for "both the steel Industry as a whole md the United




operatiog rata of 40 percent of sales.” One of its expert witnesses, a
manageoent consultant formerly associated with the Industry, estimated that in
the third quarter of 1957 the break-STen point for U.S. Steel Corporation had
drof^d to 32 percent of capacity. This estimate of the break-even point
within the industry, coincides with those currently used in the financial
community in estimatixtg profits. The latter placed it at 37 percent of
capacity for the U.S. Steel Corporation end at a comparable level for o-Uier
18
leading producers.
The price increase was not "at a level above what the market can
support." The Industry made no effort to help customers develop markets
through Icwer prices. This possibility it has discounted on the assumption
common among many oligopolists that the demand fbr steel was essentially
inelastic. While many users of steel are definitely responsive to price and
are handicapped by these increases, the Industry minimizes its significance
19
in affeetixtg its total operation.
Administered prices in most instances are not responsive to demand and
are set on artificial and questioneble assumptions. Their profit target
tends to be unduly high and designed to finance all or a substantial portion
of the oompeny's expansion from internal sources. Sellers utilize their
econ(»iie power to maintain high prioes. Concession like lower prices are
seldom made when operations rise above standard levels end few efforts are
made to encourage demand Ihirough price cuts where produotion is low. The
^®Ibld.
19 Ibid., pp. 15-16
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companies have stood by these higher prices irrespective of national policy
and objectives. They feel no responsibility for making their pricing
policies rise with the Nation* s objective of attaining "maximinn employment
20
and production." Their practices) moreover, stimulate inflation.
Major Service Areas
Many commentators have already observed that price increases for the
service components of the Consumer Price Index have pressed hard t^on our
cost of living. Much of the overall Inflation has stemmed from this source.
While the Consumer Price Index increased by 8.1 per cent from June 1955 to
June, 1^8, the i^se among the services was 9.8 per cent. In each of ihe last
3 years, the rise in the service oonq^onent was more than in the commodity
components. Prom Jtme, 1965 to June 1956, the rise in the commodities as
compared with services was 1.3 par cent to 2.1 per cent; for the year fz^^m
Jxme, 1956 to June, 1957, 5.1 per cent to 3.9 per cent; and for the last
21
year, fz^m June, 1957 to Jtsie, 1958 , 2.6 per cent to 3.5 per cent.
The hipest increase in prices for the 5 year period was in medical
care, 13.8 per cent. Ihe others in decending order were as follows: personal
care, 12.1 per cent} tremsportation, 10.4 per cent; reading and recreation,
9.9 per cent; and housing, 6.7 per cent. All of the items but housing ex-
22
seeded the overall rise in the Consxi&er Price Index.
The increases in the cost of seirvioes may originate from either one of





used such as drugs in the case of medical care, automobiles in transportation,
toilet goods for personal care, radios for recreation, or fuel for homes.
Second, the services themselves may cost more as in the case of hospital
care, higher doctor or dentist fees, transportation fares, barber and
23
beautician prices, home maintenance costs, or postage rates.
Unlike in other areas in the cost of living most of the impact of the
high®** prices and charges is transmitted directly and In full to the consmer,
compensating in^rovements in efficiency h^ve been modest. The prices for
materials passed on to the consumer reflect in part the power of the oli¬
gopolist to raise and maintain his charges.
Another complication in appraising the cost of services related to the
level of labor rates. There are basically three types of grotrps in so far
as our analysis is concerned. There are, first the hundreds of thousaxids of
workers in these fields whose pay has been and continue to be substandard.
These include workers in laitndries, dry-cleaning establishements, hospitals,
buildings, and telephone and telegrwph industries. Upward adjustments in
wages for these persons are imperative if we are to eliminate repressive
wage rates in this eotsitry. Second, there are those workers whose rates
are more nearly in line with most other grotqps and whose wages are set either
milaterally, which is tnie for the greater number, or theoxigh collective
bargaining. Finally, there are the independent professionals such as doctors,
dentists, lawyers and others whose professional fees have risen markedly.
Many questions have been asked concerning this final or professional groiq>.
They set their own fees. Have they raised their fees without re-evaluating
the changes in their professional life cycle so Uiat they owe it to the country
25Ibid.
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to -work out a more rational scale of parent; and, of course, as in other
instances, one of the questions arising respecting prices is ahether the
profit Biargins have been raised as well. There is evidence that such rise
24
has occurred in many seirvice fields.
Government Spending
Government spending declined sharply from the World War II peak after
the war but then began a substantial rise. From 1947 -- their low point — to
1957, government purchases of goods and services rose 71 per cent. State and
local purchases increased by almost as lar^ a percentage as Federal purchases.
The rise in government spwiding was itself partly the result of rising
prices. But, even after takii^ account of -Uiis, real government purchases
i
rose by 103 per cent — mmh more, proportionately, than the rise in private
purahases. The main cattse of this large increase in the demand for p. oods
and services by government were the requirements of national security, iiie
backlogs of need left at the end of the war, and the growth of population —
the last two being especially Important at the state and local level. But,
of course, there were many other forces at work.
'he fact -Ujat the economy was not on a "peacetime*' basis, in the sense
that the word is ordinarily tised, contributed to inflationary pressures.
Wational Security expenditures reached 14 per cent of the gross national product
in 1952 and 1953, end never fell below 10 per cent thereafter. The high level
of defense expenditures, even when they were not rising, had an inflationary
influence probably disproportionate to the amounts spent. Compotition for labor




are not limited in many oases by the necessity to meet market eompetitoon. The
special dffinands of defense production and hoarding of personnel in defense
plants hare resulted in substantial shortage of managerial, professional,
technical, and skilled personnel. Kie higher wage rates caused by these
factors spread into other industries, first in the same area and then else>
where.
For the postwar period as a whole. Federal gowemraent expenditures were
balanced by taxes. This did not, however, take the inflationary sting out
of the rise of expenditures. Expenditures inoreased more, from 1947 to 1957,
thsm tax collections inoreased* Thus, the surplus of government income over
outgo was smaller, both absolutely and in relation to national inocme, at
the end of the period than at the beginning.
Even if the rise of expenditures had been exactly matched by the rise
of tax collections, it iw>uld probably have had the effect of increasing total
demaiKi (private plus government spending). This is so because, in part, the
higher taxes necessary for such a balance would probably hsve reduced private
savings, not private spending, so private spending would not have been out
26
as much as govensnent spending rose.
25««Defense Against Inflation," op. cit., pp. 23-24.
CHAPTER 17
SUIOIABT AND CONCUJSICn
In general, prices have moired upward in three distinct wawes since
the end of World War II. The first wave, reflecting the pent-up demand of
consumers and businessmen following four years of wartime shortages aiul
controls, began at the end of 1945 and ended in the susainer of 1948. The
second wawe, which was dominated by developments in Korea, was concentrated
mainly in the latter half of 1950 and the early months of 1951. The third
wave extended from mid-1955 through most of 1957. Prices declined on the
average between the first and second wave — a period which coincided with
the 1948-49 recession) but they were stable or rose moderately between the
second and third wares — a period which core red years of high employment as
well as the 1953-54 recession.
The dominating influences on prices in the past ten years have been
continued strong demands in most lines of business and rising costs. How¬
ever, there have been significant changes in relative prices, reflecting
the differential impact of changing demand-supply and cost-profit relation¬
ships in different sectors of the economy. The most striking diffSreuoes,
particularly in the latter half of the past decade, have been (1) the in¬
dependent movement of prices of services on the one hand and of prices of
commodities on the other; (2) the sharp decline in farm prices relative to
the prices of non-farm commodities; (3) the under swings in raw materials
prices rather than in prices of manufactured goods; (4) the large and
presistent increases in the prices of producers' equipmeait and of con¬
struction, even during periods when consumers goods prices were falling
41
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or stable; and (5) the narrowing of margins between the wholesale and
retail prices of consumer durable goods.
Unit labor costs in private, non-agrioultural industries fbllowed
roughly the same pattern as the general price level* They rose sharply in
three years after the end of World War II, in 1961 and 1952 and again in
1956 and 1957; the deoline between the first and second waves; and rose
slightly between the second and third. Price increases preceded unit
labor cost increase, but, fbr the entire period 1947-57, the cumulative
increase in unit labor costs was sasewhat larger than the cumulative in-
1
crease in prices.
The traditional theories certainly still occupy a dominant place in
most oirrent thinking. That is to say, the conception that the price
level is basically a reflection either of the value of the standard money,
or of changes in the quantity of circulation media as compared with the
volume of goods, premeates most of the literature of recent times. The
value of gpld theory is implicit in the proposals for the restoration of the
gold standard; and there are survivals of it lathe textbook literature.
The quantity theory prevades the discussion of deficit financing and
"monetization" of the public debt; it is inherent in statements about
velocity of circulation; and it is the heart of discussions of credit
policy as a means of controlling the price level.
Some attempt has been Mde to reconcile divergent points of view with
respect to monetary theory. Most textbook writers find harmoney rather
than disharmony in the several theories, and hold that there is an under¬
lying consistency running through all of them. Such differences as appear
^"Defense Against Inflation," op. cit., p. 71.
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are held to arise out of the varying time periods oni^ioh they are
focused. The quantity theory of Bioney is held to be a sound explanation
of long-tera price trends, while the income approach furnishes a more
adequate explanation of short-term fluctuations.
The incQBM approach occupies a larger place in current thinking.
This theory originated, it may be recalled, in the idea that the amount of
money available for spending is governed by current income in the lbrm of
wages, interest, etc., rattier than by the over-all supply of gold and credit
2
currency.
As a result of this explanatory examination of price behavior over
the period 1947-57, the fbllowing can be advanced i The record of the
American eoonoi^ regarding prices during the postwar period is a relatively
good one. ^y far Ihe largest proportion of price increases in the circum¬
stances arise either from the aftermath of World War 11 or Korean hostilities.
Even during the past two years when some economists assigned the blame
to "wate inflation," most of the price increases recorded by the Consumer
Price Index can be attributed to special circumstances, such as crop con¬
ditions, rather than to union-won wage increases. Although real wages
seem to have risen more than productivity during the two year period 1955-57,
when viewed in the context of the entire postwar period, it is clear that
employees have not gained a greater share of the benefits of productivity
than other groups in society. Increased spending by the Federal and local
goveriments was effective in increasing the money supply. And the pricing
policies of business corporations, those who administer prices, as well as
^Harold G. Uoulton, op. cit., pp. 35-36.
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those who follow administered pricing policy, played a very important
part in the Inflating of prices in the interim, 1954-67.
BIBLIOGRAPHT
Books
Bloom. 6. F. and Northrop, H. R. Economics of Labor Relations. Homewood,
Illinois} Richard D, Irwin, 1^5^.
Burns, Arthur F. Prosperity TWith Inflation. New York: Fordham University-
Press, 1955*
Estey, James. Businass Cycles. Hew Yorkt Prentice-Hall, 1941.
Fellner, Villiam. Trends and Cycles in Economic Activity. New York:
Henry Holt, 1956.
Gordon, Robert. Business Fluctuations. Now York: Harper, 1952.
Hald, Earl C. Business Cycles. Bos-ton: Houghton Mifflin, 1954.
Hansen, Alvin. The American Economy. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957.
Harriss, C. Lowell. The Anwricen Eoonony. Homewood, Illinois: Richard
Dm Irwin, 1956.
Moulton, Harold G. Can Inflation Be Controlled? Washing-ton, D.C.;
Anderson Kramer Associates, 1956.
Webster*8 Collegiate Dictionary. Springfield, Mass.: 6th Edition, 1942.
Warren, G. F. and Pearson, F. A. Prices. New York: John Wiley and Sons,
1933.
Articles
Harper, F. A. "fihy Wages Rise,” The Foundation for Economic Education,
Inc. ♦ New York: Irvington-on-Hudson, 196i.
Roger M. Glough. "Price and the Public Interest," United States Steel
Corporation, 1958.
"Problem of United States Economic Development," Committee for Economic
Development. Now York: Jeuauary, 1958, pp. 1^9-190.
"Relationship of Prices to Economic Stability and Growth," Joint Economic
Coiamittee Congress of the United States. Washington: Government
Printing Office, May and December 1958 Session, 1959.
"Labor, Big Business and Inflation," Industrial Union Departneat, AFL-CIO.
Washington, D.C.: September, 1958.
45
46
^Administered Prices," Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate.
?tfashingtoa, D.C.: i^art 3 (and Appendix Aj Steel, Part i (and Appendix)
Automobile. United States Government Office, 1957.
"liovii Can We Stay Prosperous," Uaxnell S. Stearard. Public Affairs Pamphlet.
Ho. 270, August, 1958.
"prices and Cost of Living," Monthly Labor Revievr. United States Depart-
ment of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics. Volume 63, No. 2, August,
1946.
"All-Out Kar Effort Now — The Baruch Plan," U.S. News and World Report.
August 4, 1950, Volume XXXIX, No. 5.
"ftage Line Starts to Move Up," U.S. News and World Report. August 4, 1950,
Volume XXVIX, No. 5.
"To Much Money in U.S.? Treasury-Federal Reserve Bank Argument," U.S. News
and World Report. February 16, 1951, Volume XXX, No. 7.
"Why Borrowing Will Be Harder," U.S. News and World Report. August 19, 1955,
Volume XXIX, No. 8.
Reuben A. Xessel. "Inflation—Caused Wealth Redistributiont A Test of A
Hypothesis." American Economic Review. March, 1956, Volume XLVI,
No. 1.
Roy L. Rierson. "Business Fluctuations and Inflation," American Econcmiic
Review. May, 1957, Volume IXVII, Ho. 2.
Walter A. Norton. "Trade Unionism, Full Employment and Inflation,"
American Eoonomio Review. March, 1950, Volume XL, 2101.
Sumner H. Slichter. "Do the Wage-Fixing Arrangements in the American Market
Have All Inflationary Bias," American Eoonomio Review, May, 1954,
Volume XLIV, No. 2.
C.L. Christenson. "Variation in the Inflationary Forces of Bargaining,"
American Economic Review, May, 1954, Ho. 2.
"The American Dollar," Fortune, Hay, 1945, Volume XXXI, No. 5.
APPEHDICES
The appendices illustrate through a series of charts the major
price and labor developments in the past decade.
CHART I
PRICES OF COBJfODITIES AHD SERVICES, 1929-1957
Index: 1947-49* 100
Log Scale
Source: "Defense Against Inflation," CoBEilttee for Eooncanlo Developg>ent, 1958
Conamodity prices at both the i^olesale and retail levels clearly reflect
the three eaves of 1946-48, 1950-51, and 1955-57 and the intervening inter¬
ruptions, but postwar prices of services (including shelter) shoe a continuous
upward novsnaent In recession as well as in years of high employnent. Service
and shelter prices lagged substantially behind oonsnodity prices between 1939
^nd. 1951 and they are still adjusting to postwar demand conditions.
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CHART II










The avertge of all conaianer prices for the year 1957 was about
doubled the average for 1939. For the period as a whole, prices of
consumer connnodities rose much more than the prices of consumer
services and rents. Since 1951, there has been relatively little
change in the level of consumer commodity prices as a grovip, while
rents and the prices of other services have continued upward. How¬
ever, these changes have not yet restored the px*ewar i*elationship8.
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CHART III
WHOLESALE PRICES OF FARM PRODUCTS, PROCESSED
POODS AND INDUSTRIAL COMMODITIES
1947-1957
SouroAt Pef»q«« Agalnat Inflation, CoiaiBlttes on Eeonomio Dovolop-
BOiit, i95li
Althou^ tbs index of wholesale prices changes little on balance
between the two peaks of 1951 and 1957, there were stdjstantial and
diwergent noveiaents in its major caiiq[>onents. IzKlustrtal prices mowed
within a narrow range tmtil Kid-1955 and then rose sharply. Fans prices
dropped almost 30 per cent between early 1951 and the end of 1955 and
recovered less than a third this drop in the next two years. Prices
of processed foods generally follcwod the trend of farm prices, but their
fluctuations were much milder. In December 1%7, ixsiustrial prices were
8 per cent hi^er than in March 1951, while fans prices were 21 per oent
lower and the prices of processed foods were 4 per oent lower.
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CHART IV
HBOIESAIR RRICSS OF DURAB1£ ARD ROKDURABIS
KAHUFACTUKES AHD RAW KATEBIALS
1947-1957
IndexI 1947-49 = 100
150
140
Souroei Defenae Agalmt Inflation, CoEsaittee for EoozKmiB
ve iopsent, 1^58
Despite a rise in 1956 md 1957, wholesale prioea of non¬
durable nanufaotures are still be low their 1951 peaks. Whole¬
sale prioea of durable nanufacturea, on the other hand, are
substantially higher, lozidurable raw aaterials prioes reflect
the long downward trend in farm prioea. The prioea of durable
/* rsor materials have fluctuated violently in recent years beoause
their supply does not adjust rapidly to ohanges in demand.
Ibarable raw materials prices reached record levels at the end of






Index: 1947-49 ■ 100
Source: Defense Af;alnet Infletlon, (k>Bunittee for Bconaaic Develop-
oent, 1958.
The distinguishing feature of oonsuner coBuoodity prices during the
past decade ess ttw long slow decline that followed the forward buying
suod hoartiizig of oonsuoers during the early sionths of the Korean %ar. The
average of all consumer cooBiodity prices went down 6 per cent between
December 1952 and December 1965. Food prices declined 9 per cent, while
consumer durable goods prices declined 9 per cent as a result of the re¬
duction of retail siargins. Prices of nondurable goods other than food
rose 4 per cent. The substantial upturn lhat began in the spring of 1956
affected all consumer oocsaodity prices, reflecting the heavy demands on
materials and li^or by the investiBsnt sector of the eoonos^, smaller-than-
average gains in productivity, and rising labor and rswr materials costs.
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CHART VI
AHITOAL CHANGES IN AVERAGE HOURLT COMPENSATIOU,
UNIT LABOR COSTS, AND PRICES, 1948-1967
All Privat* Konagrioultural toduatrlas
Per cent change from previoue year
«n
Soxireei Defenae^2galnjBt Inflation, Ccmsaittee for Eoonomio Development, 1968*
Average hourly oon^eneatlon rose every year between 1947 and 1956, Inoreases
ranging from a low of S.l per oent in 1949 to a hl^ of 8.7 per cent In 1951. Unit labor
oost Increases were smaller because the increase In compensation was offset by increases
in productivity. Rever^eless, unit labor costs rose sharply in 1948, 1051-63, and 1966-
67. Prices led unit labor costs in 1948, 1949 end 1950, and again in 1954 and 1956, but
unit labor costs soon caught up. For the whole period 1947-57, the increase In unit costs
was slightly hi^er than the increase in prices.
CHART VII
PROFITS AS A PER CERT OF IHCfflffi PRODUCED
BY CORPORATIOSS, 1947-1957
5
1947 •49 •51 '53 *55 *57*
*
Note: Profits exclude inventory gains aixl losses First nine months
Source: Defense Against Inflation, Committee for Sconomic Development, 1958.
Profits before taxes started out at 22 per cent of income produced by
corporations in 1947 and ended at less than 20 per cent in 1957. The lag of
unit labor costs behind prices in the period 1948-50 shows up as an increase
in the profit share from 22 per cent to 26 per cent. As labor costs caught
up, the profit share declined and, by 1954, it was down to 20 per cent. In
1955, price increases again exceeded labor cost increases axxi the profit
share went up to 22 per cent. Increased labor costs, which were due partly
to wage Increases end partly to the reduced rate of increase in productivity,
resulted in a profit squeeze in 1956 and 1957, and the profit share declined
again — bringing the figure for 1957 below the level at which it started ten
years earlier. Profits after taxes show approximately the same trends.
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CHART VIII
AHNUAL CHANGES IN PRODUCTIVITY AND REAL EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION
1948-1957
1948 1949 1950 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1956 1957
Notei The measure of produotivity used in this chart is affected by
shifts between the farm and nonfara sectors as well as shifts
within these sectors, whereas nonfara arerage hourly compensation
is affected by shifts within the sector only.
Source I Defense Against Inflation, Committee Ibr Economic Development, 1956.
In 1948, 1960 and 1951, productivity ran ahead of average hourly
compensation in constant dollars, but between 1952 and 1966 the increases
in real compensation exceeded produotiviiy gains. Particularly noteworthy
is the decline in the rate of increase in productivity in 1956 and 1957.
As indicated in the two previous charts, this lag in productivity was re¬
flected partly in increased prices and partly in reduced profit margins.
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